U.S. Foreign Policy in Transition: Major Cuts to International Organizations Amid OSCE Reform

In a policy statement titled “Ending the Charade of Wasteful International Organizations,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio explained the dramatic change in course in January 2026. The U.S. thus ended the practice of issuing “blank checks” to international bureaucracies.

Based on the findings of reviews conducted under Executive Order 14199, the U.S. announced its withdrawal from 66 bodies. Among those affected are various UN specialized agencies and agreements, such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Women, the UN Climate Secretariat (UNFCCC), and the UN Forum on People of African Descent. Rubio accused these institutions of mismanagement, politicized agenda-setting, and inefficiency. He argued that the current model of multilateralism must be replaced by a targeted capacity for action that protects U.S. sovereignty and taxpayer dollars.

The OSCE as a Forum for Tough Reforms and Diplomacy

Despite its decisive withdrawal from numerous organizations, the U.S. continues to seek an active role in strategically relevant bodies. This was particularly evident in the remarks made by the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Darrell Owens, before the Permanent Council in Vienna. Owens emphasized that the OSCE remains a central platform—especially against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war—as the only forum where states with completely opposing visions can negotiate directly and discuss security issues.

The U.S.’s priorities for the OSCE include a focus on conflict prevention, field operations, and the historic security architecture outlined in the key Helsinki documents. At the same time, the U.S. is calling for strict financial discipline, including the enforcement of timely budget decisions with rigorous cost control for the coming fiscal years, as well as streamlining bureaucracy to eliminate perceived duplicate structures in favor of pragmatic, field-based operations.

Why the OSCE Remains Indispensable to the U.S. and the Trump Administration

The U.S. decision to remain active in the OSCE despite its widespread withdrawal from multilateral bodies is based on pragmatic and strategic reasons. In the Trump administration’s geopolitical strategy, the OSCE is regarded as the only remaining security forum that directly connects the Western world with Moscow.

Unlike purely values-based or supranational organizations, the OSCE serves as a purely purpose-driven negotiating tool for the U.S. Particularly against the backdrop of shifting U.S. priorities in defense policy, Washington is seeking to share the burden in the European security sector (burden-sharing). The OSCE offers the appropriate framework for conducting direct negotiations with Russia on arms control, de-escalation, and deconfliction in the Ukraine conflict without deploying its own troops or extending permanent NATO guarantees.

The Hurdle of the Consensus Principle: Russia’s Policy of Obstruction

The fundamental problem facing the OSCE lies in its own set of rules: decisions are made by consensus among all 57 participating States. For years, Russia has systematically used this veto power to paralyze initiatives, prevent reports from being adopted, and block funding for programs that promote democracy.

A prominent example was the years-long blockade of the OSCE budget. Since 2021, the organization has operated without a regularly adopted budget and has had to make do with monthly allocations, as Russia—and at times other states as well, including the U.S. with its demands for reform—blocked budgets. Russia’s primary goal in doing so was to curtail programs of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and election observation.

Pragmatic Workarounds and Compromises in Crisis Mode

To prevent itself from becoming paralyzed, the OSCE has developed pragmatic survival and operational mechanisms. When key initiatives fail due to a Russian veto, member states resort to off-budget funding (support programs). For example, following the veto against the official OSCE presence in Ukraine, a separate aid program was established through voluntary contributions from interested participating States to circumvent the Russian blockade.

Under the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship, a breakthrough was achieved in March 2026. To break the deadlock, the 57 states agreed on a reduced budget of approximately 123 million euros. This entailed a cut of over 10 percent and led to the elimination of about 100 positions—a concession that both accommodated the U.S. administration’s budget cuts and secured Moscow’s approval. The OSCE is increasingly focusing on technical, field-based missions (e.g., border security advisory services, arms control inspections) and is removing highly politicized issues from the plenary agenda to maintain operational activities despite political tensions.

A “Survival Advantage” from the Cold War

The OSCE has learned to survive in crisis mode, and that is precisely what makes it so unique today. The OSCE (formerly the CSCE) was created in the 1970s for exactly this purpose: as a pragmatic channel for dialogue between hostile blocs. Because Russia can block meetings and budgets with its veto, the organization resorts to special off-budget programs. States that wish to support a mission (e.g., in Ukraine or the Caucasus) simply fund it directly, without Moscow being able to block the funds. The OSCE is less a rigid supranational authority than a diplomatic platform with many field missions on the ground.

The OSCE is therefore by no means merely a pawn in the game between the U.S. and Russia. With 57 participating states from Europe, North America, and Central Asia, it is primarily the European states (such as Germany, France, Switzerland, or Austria, as the host country) that shoulder the organization’s day-to-day work. The rotating chairmanship (currently held by Switzerland) enables more neutral or mediating states to negotiate compromises—such as the agreement on the 2026 budget. European states make extensive use of the OSCE for security issues on their own continent (border protection, protection of minorities, arms control), regardless of who is in the White House.

The geographical focus on the Euro-Atlantic region and the strong involvement of European actors ensure the OSCE’s survival. While other organizations are fracturing due to polarization, the OSCE uses flexible special rules and the diplomacy of European states to remain capable of acting even in extremely difficult times.

Transition from “Blank-Check Multilateralism” to “Transactional Bilateralism”

The Trump administration no longer views international organizations as an end in themselves or as guardians of a community of values. The fact that the OSCE cut its budget by over 10 percent and eliminated positions under pressure from the U.S. and in light of changing geopolitical realities serves as a model for Washington. The message to remaining organizations is clear: reform and cut costs—or the U.S. will pull out. Bodies that are not prepared to reduce costs, maintain political neutrality, or focus on core tasks face the same fate as the 66 UN and non-UN organizations that have been phased out.

Multilateral forums are used selectively, like a toolbox. Where an institution serves immediate U.S. security or trade interests—such as the OSCE in crisis prevention with Russia or in de-escalation—the U.S. remains at the negotiating table. However, bilateral (one-on-one) negotiations are preferred, as Washington can, from a position of strength, extort or negotiate more concessions on a case-by-case basis than in large forums, where smaller states can form alliances.

The assumption that the U.S. can force any negotiating partner to its knees bilaterally (one-on-one) through a sheer demonstration of power suffers, however, from several logical fallacies and misjudgments in practice. The administration’s basic assumption is: “The U.S. market and U.S. military power are so dominant that no one can do without us,” and an underestimation of globalization. However, both overlook the ability of counterparties to respond. When Washington threatens punitive tariffs or withdrawal from agreements, major powers like China or blocs such as the EU do not simply cave in. China, for example, used strategic tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods and imposed supply cuts on rare earth metals, which severely disrupted U.S. supply chains and forced Washington to back down. Smaller countries simply find workarounds. When the U.S. terminates bilateral agreements or demands unfair terms, these countries turn to alternatives (e.g., investments from China, agreements with the EU or the BRICS countries).

In a multilateral framework, the U.S. can, for example, work together with Japan, the EU, Australia, and Canada to exert unified pressure on China regarding intellectual property or unfair market rules. However, if Washington attacks each country individually (imposing tariffs on both partners and adversaries), no one will ally with the U.S. China was able to weather or mitigate the U.S.’s isolated attacks because Washington chose not to rely on international alliances.

Where existing multilateral frameworks fail to meet U.S. demands or are perceived as too slow, the administration creates its own, tailor-made forums in an attempt to solve this problem. One example of this is the establishment of initiatives such as the “Peace Council,” which is conceived as a lean, strongly U.S.-led body for concrete conflict resolution (e.g., post-conflict peace arrangements). In this way, Washington circumvents traditional UN bureaucracy and establishes structures that link financial contributions to direct voting rights. However, this, too, has not been marked by great success for the same reasons as the other bilateral initiatives.

Actual Multilateral forums (such as the WTO or the OSCE) exist to establish regulatory frameworks for dozens of countries at once. Attempting to renegotiate hundreds of complex trade and security agreements individually on a bilateral or trilateral basis would overwhelm even the U.S.’s massive diplomatic apparatus. The result is a confusing “patchwork” of exemptions, special tariffs, and countermeasures that unsettles companies and paralyzes markets.

The fact that the U.S. has not withdrawn from the OSCE shows that the administration has, at least in part, recognized the failure of the purely bilateral approach in security policy. To manage conflicts with a major power like Russia, one-on-one talks are not enough, because the European security architecture requires a common, broad forum in which all neighbors sit at the table.

Trump’s purely transactional bilateralism reached its limits wherever his counterparts were strong enough to fight back, or where the sheer complexity of global problems could not be squeezed into simple numerical deals. A truly robust multilateral treaty has the advantage of being more stable. A bilateral deal based purely on blackmail or threats lasts only as long as the threat is maintained. Partners are looking behind the U.S.’s back for long-term ways to reduce their dependence on Washington.

Shift in Power Toward Europe and Other Regional Powers

The U.S. withdrawal and its hardline stance in forums such as the OSCE are forcing European nations in particular (the EU, Switzerland, and the UK) to undergo a strategic realignment. If the U.S. cuts its contributions or limits itself to hard security alone, European nations must fill the financial and organizational gap—for example, in election observation, civil society support, or climate initiatives. Europe is learning to lead and safeguard multilateral platforms more independently to prevent the global rules-based architecture from collapsing entirely without the U.S. or being filled by rivals such as China.

Trump’s approach does not yet amount to complete isolationism, but rather marks the end of multilateralism as it was traditionally understood. The OSCE exemplifies this new principle: in the U.S. calculus, organizations survive only if they focus on hard security interests, drastically cut costs, and prove themselves to be a flexible negotiating forum between major powers.

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